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Introduction 
In the summer of 2001, as a graduate student in law and theology, 
I began work on a master’s thesis that examined the predicament of 
men of faith on San Quentin’s Condemned Row. I was working in the 
California Appellate Project—mostly assisting with direct appeals and 
state habeas petitions on behalf of men under a death sentence—when 
a colleague guided me into theological conversations with some of 
our clients.1 On Condemned Row, they waited—up to five years to be 
assigned a court-appointed appellate attorney, on judges’ rulings, and 
to find whether the legal system would ultimately exact the penalty it 
had prescribed. Some struggled with guilt or loss, and all endured the 
boredom of days spent in solitary cells. 
If anyone needed the solace of faith, it was these men. I began the 
project, frankly, with a fair amount of skepticism that the men had 
become faithful opportunistically. (I recalled once having read about a 
prisoner who filed a lawsuit for not being offered a so-called religiously-
mandated diet of lobster and champagne, which pretty well summed 
up my thoughts on prisoner religious practice.) I was also personally 
dissatisfied by supernatural answers to life’s questions and approached 
the prisoners’ religious beliefs with a mixture of agnostic temerity and 
hyper-educated condescension. But after the year spent corresponding 
and meeting with these men and their attorneys or spiritual advisors, I 
was impressed by the modesty of their requests and the persistence of 
the prison’s denials of their religious requests.
In 2001, nearly every aspect of each man’s religious practice was 
subject to (and limited by) the policies of the wardens of San Quentin. 
Prisoners were entirely at the mercy of the prison with regard to the diet 
prepared, the religious services offered, and the counseling or spiritual 
advice available. And frequently, what was offered or forbidden forced 
a prisoner to break a requirement of his faith. 
Until the passage of the short-lived Religious Freedom and 
Restoration Act2 (RFRA) in 1993, prisoners’ legal claims related to their 
free exercise of religion were evaluated under a test that required them 
both to justify the importance of a particular practice and to prove that 
a prison’s concerns about safety and budgeting (or any other concerns a 
*Assoc. Professor of Law, Mercer University Walter F. George School of Law. BA, Mercer 
University, summa cum laude; MTS, Candler School of Theology; JD, Emory Law School. I would 
like to thank Karin Tilly, Michael Umberger, Brooke Walker, Sabrina Atkins, and Ashley Short for 
their very able (and amiable) research assistance on this project. I would also like to thank Dean 
Gary Simson for offering his guidance and insight.
1  The topics of religion and capital punishment frequently overlap, even outside the context of 
religious practice on death row. See Gary J. Simson & Stephen P. Garvey, Knockin’ on Heavens Door: 
Rethinking the Role of Religion in Death Penalty Cases, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1090 (2001).
2  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
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Warden might offer) were not justified under the circumstances.3 Such 
litigation also put prisoners in the position of defending the sincerity of 
their faith and the action which that faith required. 
But the 1990s had been an active decade for proponents of free 
exercise and offered promise of new legal standards and, perhaps, new 
prison policies. The RFRA required the government to provide evidence 
of a “compelling interest” in cases of freedom of religion.4 It, however, 
was struck down as applied to state law by the United States Supreme 
Court in 19975 as overreaching Congressional authority. Only a year 
before I began my work in California, a defiant U.S. Congress passed 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act6 (RLUIPA). 
That Act was far more generous than the Turner test, but it was too soon 
to tell whether the men would ever enjoy RLUIPA’s promised benefits.
First, RLUIPA, like RFRA, seemed vulnerable to an Establishment 
Clause challenge and was clearly destined to be the subject of litigation 
about its constitutionality.7 Second, men who had litigated under Turner 
had become almost accustomed to denials of religious claims and felt 
powerless to prompt change. But unexpected challenges lay within a 
piece of legislation passed after RFRA and before RLUIPA: the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act8 (PLRA). The PLRA was intended to weed out 
prisoners’ meritless, successive, or inartfully-crafted civil legal claims,9 
but because it was passed after RFRA, it had not been an impediment 
to litigation under that statute.
The project changed me and how I thought of prison lawsuits 
related to religious practice. I came to understand these lawsuits as 
overwhelmingly reasonable, modest, and related to the core of lives 
of faith. And so I became particularly interested in whether our courts 
offered a means by which to vindicate otherwise-frustrated needs to 
act in belief as a follower sees fit.
I fully appreciate that some—perhaps even many—prisoner 
religious claims are self-serving, meritless, or abusive. Some suits are 
merely the outgrowth of boredom, frustration with prison authority, or 
are cynical expressions of a prisoner with far more interest in filing serial 
3  See infra page 128-30 for a more comprehensive description of this test that was established by 
the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley.
4  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2)(b) of RFRA states that the government may interfere only if it demonstrates 
that the law is “the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.”
5  City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 U.S. 507 (1997). 
6  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1 et seq. (2006).
7  Although an Establishment Clause issue was not the basis for the majority of the Supreme 
Court’s declaring RFRA unconstitutional, the Establishment issue was noted by Justice Stevens in 
his concurrence. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536-37 (Stevens, J., concurring).
8  42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1996).
9  145 Cong. Rec. H5598 (1999) (daily ed. July 15, 1999) (statement of Rep. Nadler noting that “this 
bill limits the right of prison inmates to raise otherwise valid claims under the bill by specifically 
referencing the Prison Litigation Reform Act”).
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lawsuits than to practice a religion of any stripe.10 However, I believe the 
law of free exercise (particularly free exercise in prison) employs legal 
tests that are sufficient to ferret out the “nonbeliever” or the abusive 
litigant. Years later, this article follows on, examining how RLUIPA 
has borne up under constitutional scrutiny, and whether it has had its 
intended impact upon the men of faith who live in American prisons. 
If, for example, the purpose of RLUIPA was to remove encumbrances 
upon religious practice in prison, has it succeeded? Or has RLUIPA 
been another disappointment, given the deference traditionally given 
to prison officials?
The intersection of these two laws is sufficiently beneath most 
scholars’ attention that those writing on RLUIPA have had little—if 
anything—to say on the matter; this Article is the first to fully examine 
the impact of the PLRA upon prisoners’ RLUIPA claims. What I found 
after a national survey of lower court cases and reported appellate 
opinions, however, was deeply disappointing, if not surprising. For all 
the heavy rhetoric and bipartisan support behind RLUIPA’s passage, the 
ultimate outcomes of prisoners’ lawsuits related to their free exercise 
reveals that it has had only a modest impact. There may or may not exist 
the political will to modify either law such that prisoners’ claims have 
more likelihood of success, but given the practical and legal restrictions 
upon litigation of this sort, the radical change promised in RFRA and 
RLUIPA still eludes most prisoners litigating free exercise claims.
I. Perspectives And Context
It was not man who implanted in himself the taste for what is infinite and the 
love of what is immortal; these instincts are not the offspring of his capricious 
will; their steadfast foundation is fixed in human nature, and they exist in 
spite of his efforts. 
—de Tocqueville, Democracy in America11 
Why does all of this matter? What difference does it make whether 
RLUIPA’s new legal test has been effective or has fostered a change for 
prisoners? I will begin with a broad inquiry into the fundamental need 
of many to belong to a religious group and the importance of religious 
practice in the United States. More specifically, this chapter will focus 
upon the significance of faith among incarcerated persons generally and 
the needs and motivations of prisoners, prison chaplains, and prison 
administrators. 
10  Tony Barboza, Inmate Claims Fictitious ‘Festivus’ Religious Holiday to Score Better Food, L.A. 
Now, Dec. 14, 2010, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/12/oc-inmate-claims-religious-
ties-to-festivus-to-score-better-food.html (“An Orange County jail inmate caused a stir this year 
by successfully claiming the fictitious holiday Festivus, made famous on the television show 
‘Seinfeld,’ as part of his religious beliefs to score better meals.”).
11  Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy In America, Volume 2 (1840).
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For the faithful, religion forms identity, nourishes the soul, and 
orients the believer within world. According to a relatively recent poll, 
“an overwhelming majority (96%) of Americans endorse a belief in God 
or a universal spirit.”12 Though religious orientation and belief may vary, 
as explained by Karen van der Merwe, “people want to understand 
themselves and the world in which they live. This quest for understanding 
and meaning is ultimately a spiritual endeavor as it entails searching for 
meaning beyond the self, thus transcending the self.”13
For many—and more specifically, in our American context—belief 
in a higher authority or power is fundamental to being human.14 Or, as 
Douglas Laycock describes, religious beliefs are “important enough to 
die for, to suffer for, to rebel for, to emigrate for, to fight to control the 
government for.” 15
It is true that our nation values the separation of Church and State, 
but, of course that too may be motivated by our collective understanding 
of the importance of our freedom to practice (within notable limitations) 
as dictated by our conscience. “Within the liberty guaranteed by 
the Religion Clauses,” writes Laycock, “the free human beings who 
make up the sovereign People may experience a Great Awakening of 
Christianity, a mass conversion to Islam or New Age mysticism or any 
other faith, or an overwhelming swing to atheism.”16 Not surprisingly, 
then, in a 2007 poll conducted by the First Amendment Center, 74% 
of respondents stated that “the right to practice the religion of your 
choice” is essential and 57% found the “right to practice no religion” to 
be essential.17
Just as the people demand the freedom of conscience and room for 
plurality, space for religious ritual is important for several reasons. It 
connects the believer to her inward soul, her outward community, and 
to the God she seeks. Symbolic or not, religious ritual means something: 
it transports those who take part to a world of higher and better 
things—to clearer insight, to deeper conviction, or stronger connection 
to God. Ritual is also a sign of membership in a group, which is of no 
small importance. Dietary laws, the Christian sacraments, the pillars of 
12  Heather S. Lonczak et al., Religious Coping and Psychological Functioning in a Correctional 
Population, 9 Mental Health, Religion & Culture 171 (2006).
13  Karen van der Merwe, A Psychological Perspective on the Source and Function of Religion, 66 
HTS Theological Studies 2010 1, 4 available at http://www/hts.org.za (“Religion provides the 
framework or meaning, as the quintessence of meaningfulness is connectedness with God, self 
and others.”).
14  See also Gary J. Simson, Endangering Religious Liberty, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 441 (1996).
15  Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 313, 317 (1996).
16  Id. at 313. 
17  First Amendment Center, State of the First Amendment 2007, 2 (2007), http://www.
firstamendmentcenter.org/PDF/SOFA2007results.pdf; see also Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The 
Genesis of RLUIPA and Federalism: Evaluating the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and Its Impact 
on Local Government, 40 Urb. Law. 195, 196 (2008) (“The religion clauses of the First Amendment, 
which simultaneously forbid the government from establishing religion and from prohibiting its 
free exercise, are looked upon with great respect and admiration by many.”). 
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Islam, ritual grasses, and the like, not only link the pious to the deity 
but also link the believer to others who recognize that deity. Robert 
Bellah, discussing Durkheim’s notions of ritual and community, writes, 
“ [in] ritual interaction the members of the group, through their shared 
experience, feel a sense of membership, however fleeting, with a sense 
of boundary between those sharing the experience and those outside 
it; they feel some sense of moral obligation to each other. . . ”18 That is, 
religion, through ritual and belonging, sets up standards of obligation 
to members of that community and informs that group’s understanding 
of belonging, morality, and roles within the community. 
A. The Conflicting Constituencies 
One of the problems with accommodating religious practice in 
prison is that there are several different interested parties involved, 
each with varied motivations and each with legitimate concerns.
First, take the prisoners’ priorities. As populations diversify, so 
do religious beliefs.19 At the same time, connectedness to community 
(sometimes a new one, sometimes one of importance from a time 
before a prisoner’s incarceration) becomes especially important. As 
acknowledged by Justice Brennan, dissenting in O’Lone v. Shabazz, “[i]
ncarceration by its nature denies a prisoner participation in the larger 
human community. To deny the opportunity to affirm membership 
in a spiritual community, however, may extinguish an inmate’s last 
source of hope for dignity and redemption.” 20 
Religion, as it offers prisoners hope and purpose generally, also 
encourages learning and self-improvement. The tale of a prisoner—
formerly lawless, apathetic and angry—undergoing a process of 
renewal or rebirth is not a new one. Certainly one of the most well-
known stories of a conversion in prison is the one that Malcolm X tells 
in his autobiography. 21 But Malcolm X is not the only person who has 
been transformed as a result of religious conversion in prison; many 
18  Robert Bellah, Durkheim and Ritual, in Cambridge Companion to Durkheim, 185-86 (Jeffrey C. 
Alexander & Philip Smith, eds. 2005).
19  See also Laycock, supra note 15 at 317 (“… the affirmative goal is to create a regime in which 
people of fundamentally different views about religion can live together in a peaceful and self-
governing society.”); Daniel O. Conkle, Religious Truth, Pluralism, and Secularization: The Shaking 
Foundation of American Religious Liberty, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1755, 1767-68 (2011) (“Religion in 
America has become radically diverse, and it is likely to become even more so in the decades that 
lie ahead. As Professor Stephen J. Stein has explained, the history of American religion has been a 
story of ever-increasing religious diversity.”).
20  O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 368 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21  Malcolm X (As told to Alex Haley), The Autobiography of Malcolm X, 153 (1964) (“To 
understand that of any person, his whole life, from birth, must be reviewed. . . . I am spending 
many hours [in the preparation of this book] because the full story is the best way that I know 
to have it seen, and understood, that I had sunk to the very bottom of the American white man’s 
society when—soon now, in prison – I found Allah and the religion of Islam and it completely 
transformed my life.”).
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men become motivated to seek personal enlightenment only after a 
criminal conviction. 
Belief and faithful commitment may also lead prisoners to help 
others—whether in a “faith-sharing” sense or in a more practical 
sense. It also offers belonging and acceptance: acceptance often by a 
deity, but also from the welcoming embrace of like-minded people in 
a similar situation. A primary purpose of religious practice “in prison 
is not only to reduce anti-social behavior/criminal behavior or relapse 
into criminal activity but also to counteract the tendency of prisons to 
dehumanize people and help prisoners prevent a further decline in 
their humanity.”22 In a society continually at risk of violence, religion 
may “prevent the further deterioration of inmates by helping them to 
cope with being a social outcast in a prison situation that is fraught 
with loss, deprivation, and survival challenges.” 23
Anyone who has reviewed prisoners’ free exercise lawsuits is 
familiar with administrators’ reasons for denying or curtailing certain 
practices. Safety, order, and budget are all, of course, valid concerns for 
a prison administrator. Prison is a dangerous place in which to work 
or live. State and federal budget cuts have real impact upon prison 
rehabilitation and security programs. And wardens shoulder a heavy 
burden of responsibility not only to their staff and their charges but 
to the larger community. Richard Symes, a longtime prison minister, 
observes that while prison rules may seem draconian to the outsider, 
“almost all rules are made to help implement the prison’s intention to 
create a safe place for everyone.” 24 
On the other hand, Symes explains, “It is also true that the prison 
staff will on occasion ignore, twist, and unfairly administer the rules to 
either favor or punish a specific prisoner.” 25 Likewise, the Congressional 
record surrounding RLUIPA itself includes an acknowledgment of 
inappropriate limitations on prisoners’ religious practice: “It is well 
known that prisoners often file frivolous claims; it is less well known 
that prison officials sometimes impose frivolous or arbitrary rules. 
Whether from indifference, ignorance, bigotry, or lack of resources, 
some institutions restrict religious liberty in egregious and unnecessary 
ways.”26 
Although religious accommodation makes prison administration 
more complicated and many prisons are unwilling to offer more than 
legally required, a prisoner’s faith does offer some ancillary benefits for 
22  Melvina Sumter, Faith-Based Prison Programs, 5 Crim. & Pub. Pol’y 523, 525 (2006) (citing Todd 
R. Clear et al., The Value of Religion in Prison: An Inmate Perspective, 16 J. of Contemp. Crim. Just. 
53–74 (2000)).
23  Id. 
24  Richard A. Symes, As Though you were in Prison with Them, 53 Presbyterian Criminal Justice 
Program, Kentucky 2000.
25  Id.
26  146 Cong. Rec. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy).
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prison officials.27As discussed above, prisoners with hope and purpose 
are, pragmatically speaking, easier to control. Prisoners have more to 
lose and more at stake when connected to a faith group, and many 
men, through religious study, learn anew the importance of respect for 
authority.28
There are, of course, notable exceptions to this general rule, and 
attendant concerns and fears about these deviations may result in 
discrimination against minority religious groups. While some groups 
advocate harmony and peace, other groups are suspected to advocate 
political agitation and overthrow of oppression.29 
Against this backdrop of varied interests, priorities, perspectives, 
needs, limitations, and guidelines RLUIPA and free exercise claims are 
brought, defended against, and decided. No one can reasonably argue 
with a prison warden’s desire for order and safety; she has her staff and 
inmates’ safety to protect, as well as the public’s general confidence 
in the prison system.30 On the other hand, with religious practice and 
free exercise as closely-held American values—with attending practical 
applications in the prison context—there are powerful countervailing 
reasons to question restrictions burdening religious practice. 
II. The Undulating Landscape of Free Exercise Tests 
A prisoner does not altogether forfeit his or her First Amendment 
right to free exercise of religion—even though it may be limited by 
incarceration.31 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has so eloquently 
27  Id. In the three years leading up to RLUIPA’s passage, Congress heard testimony and found that 
some officials in institutions impose arbitrary restrictions on the religious practices of prisoners. 
Many of these restrictions did not further an institution’s policy on discipline, order, or safety. Not 
surprisingly then, there is a congressional record supporting action to make it easier for prisoners 
to practice their religions and to more easily challenge restrictions upon their exercise. Id.
28  Aaron K. Block, When Money is Tight, is Strict Scrutiny Loose?: Cost Sensitivity as a Compelling 
Governmental Interest Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 14 Tex. 
J. on C.L. & C.R. 237, 247 (2009). “Cutter declared that courts reviewing RLUIPA claims should 
recognize that “context matters” in the application of the Act’s strict scrutiny test. Referencing the 
Act’s legislative history, the Court noted that ‘lawmakers supporting RLUIPA were mindful of the 
urgency of discipline, order, safety, and security in penal institutions.’”).
29  John W. Popeo, Combating Radical Islam in Prisons within the Legal Dictates of the Free Exercise 
Clause, 32 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 135, 140-41 (2006) However, government 
officials, even under RLUIPA, still look at ways to regulate religion within prisons. For 
example, “based on the fear of Islamic radicals exploiting prisons chaplaincies and institutional 
programs provided for inmates, government officials have proposed a number of more stringent 
requirements [on Islamic radicals].” Id. 
30  See Religious Liberties Act ‘Compromise’ Compromises Local Authority, Nation’s Cities Weekly, 
July 24, 2000 (“Oversight of jails and corrections facilities involves weighing public safety, the 
security of staff and the safety and individual rights of inmates, as well as many other factors 
that affect budgetary and management decisions. This bill would restrict the ability of local 
governments to set appropriate corrections policies.”).
31  Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 76, 84 (1987). In Turner v. Safely, the Supreme Court recognized 
that “prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the 
Constitution.” Id.
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articulated, “[t]he right to the free exercise of religion is to be jealously 
guarded. It is the right of a human being to respond to what that 
person’s conscience says is the dictate of God… A human being does 
not cease to be a human being because the human being is a prisoner 
of the state.” 32
Although the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,”33 the United States 
Supreme Court has long distinguished the freedom to believe from 
the freedom to act – or be exempted from reasonable and generally-
applicable laws.34 Protection of religious organizations from the 
interference of the state has waxed and waned, undergoing several 
incarnations from Sherbert through Smith to RFRA and RLUIPA. 
Prisoners’ free exercise claims have never been appellate court darlings, 
but the likelihood of success in those cases has risen and fallen as the legal 
tests around general free exercise claims have undulated. Long before any 
statutes related to court review of free exercise claims (much less prisoner 
free exercise claims), the U.S. Supreme Court and lower appellate courts 
have struggled with appropriate tests and ranges of acceptable state limits 
on Americans’ right to practice as their consciences dictate.
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Prior To 
Employment Division v. Smith
Until Employment Division v. Smith,35 the Supreme Court’s early 
decisions interpreting Free Exercise claims held that generally-
applicable state and local laws were constitutional as long as the laws 
served a rational government purpose. This test operated regardless of 
whether the laws inhibited a religious person from practicing a certain 
tenet of his faith. 36
In 1963, the Court’s decision in Sherbert v. Verner37 moved in a new 
direction: an otherwise neutral law with a discriminatory impact upon 
a religious practice would be subject to strict scrutiny.38 If, then, a 
32 Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 876 (1993). In Walsh, an Orthodox Jewish prisoner in a Nevada state 
prison brought suit under Section 1983 alleging that by denying him a kosher diet, clothes made 
of a single fabric, and access to an Orthodox rabbi; by refusing to allow him to have candles in 
his cell; and by disregarding his request to promise to not be transported on the Sabbath prison 
officials had violated his First Amendment right to free exercise. 
33  U.S. Const. amend. I.
34  See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
35  494 U.S. 872 (1990).
36 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1978) (holding that a territory’s law 
criminalizing bigamy was constitutional, making the distinction between laws that interfere with 
religious practices versus those that interfere with religious belief or opinion); see also Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (explicitly incorporating the Free Exercise Amendment, 
but making a distinction between freedom to believe and freedom to act).
37  374 U.S. 398 (1963).
38  Id.
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plaintiff could prove a “substantial burden” on his religious practice, 
the government was required to demonstrate that the “compelling 
governmental interest” motivating the law could not have been satisfied 
through less restrictive means.39 Nearly a decade later, in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder,40 the Court struck down a Wisconsin law requiring public school 
attendance of children under the age of sixteen. 41 Finding that the 
children of the Amish plaintiffs were adequately educated within their 
own community, it held that the law unreasonably burdened the free 
exercise rights of those challenging the law.42 
By the 1980’s, however, after the Sherbert/Yoder decisions, the 
Supreme Court purported to apply strict scrutiny analysis when 
reviewing facially-neutral decisions but failed to apply the test as 
rigidly as it had in those earlier opinions. For example, in Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,43 the Supreme Court 
rejected a challenge to a forest service road that ran directly through a 
sacred Native American site.44 The Court reasoned that the road only 
“incidentally” burdened the exercise of religion and did not “coerce” 
anyone to violate religious beliefs.45 Further, in United States v. Lee,46 
the Court refused to hold social security and unemployment insurance 
taxes unconstitutional as applied to Amish employers because, even 
though the taxes did burden Amish beliefs, the government had a 
compelling interest in preserving the social security system.47 
B. Prisoners’ Free Exercise Cases And Precedent 
At the same time as the high Court was narrowing and revising its 
tests related to generally-applicable laws concerning free exercise, it 
began to look at prisoners’ cases. In the late 1980s, the Turner v. Safley 
test became the applicable standard governing prisoners’ claims under 
section 1983—including free exercise claims. Under that analysis, the 
State was simply required to show that its action was “reasonably 
related” to a “legitimate penological interest.”48 Turner was an attempt 
to “balance” the protection of prisoners’ constitutional rights with 
39  Id.
40  406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
41  Id. 
42  Id.
43  485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
44  Id. 
45  Id. 
46  455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
47  Id.
48  Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; see also Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and 
Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 501, 507-08 (2005) 
(“The renaissance of prisoner free exercise claims ended with the Supreme Court’s 1987 decision 
in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz.  Citing its earlier precedent of Turner v. Safley, which narrowly 
construed the due process rights of prisoners, the Court rejected both strict and heightened 
scrutiny for prisoner free exercise claims.”). 
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legitimate correctional priorities by considering a number of factors, 
such as the extent to which alternate avenues for religious practice 
remained open to inmates and the impact that accommodation would 
have on prison operations.49 Not surprisingly, very few prisoners’ 
lawsuits prevailed under the Turner analysis. 
As the four Turner dissenters—Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and 
Blackmun—presciently identified, “[t]he Court’s rather open-ended 
‘reasonableness’ standard makes it much too easy to uphold restrictions 
on prisoners’ First Amendment rights on the basis of administrative 
concerns and speculation about possible security risks rather than 
on the basis of evidence that the restrictions are needed to further an 
important governmental interest.”50 
For example, O’Lone, decided one week after Turner and using the 
test prescribed therein, confirmed that prisons are, with some guidelines, 
allowed to limit fundamental rights by alleging that they have a reasonable 
justification for doing so. 51 From the beginning of its opinion in O’Lone, 
the Court recognized it had recently determined a “proper standard” to 
apply when an inmate is challenging a prison regulation and asserting it 
restricts inmates’ constitutional rights.52 It reiterated the notion that the 
Turner approach ‘“ensures the ability of corrections officials ‘to anticipate 
security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable 
problems of prison administration.’”53
The lower court in O’Lone had required prison officials to show that 
no reasonable policy would allow the prisoners to attend Jumu’ah54 
without creating security concerns. The Supreme Court, however, 
declined to adopt that test; instead, it looked generally to whether the 
prisoners had alternative means to observe their faith—without regard 
to any particular religious practice.55 After determining that prisoners 
could participate in other Muslim practices, such as observing 
Ramadan56 and dietary requirements, the Court decided that there 
49  Id. The complete list of Turner factors require that courts consider (1) whether there existed 
a “valid, rational connection” between the prison regulation and the legitimate (and neutral) 
governmental interest justifying it; (2) whether alternative means of exercising the right remained 
open to prison inmates; (3) the sort of impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right 
might have on guards and other prisoners, and on the allocation of prison resources generally; 
and (4) whether there exists a reasonable alternative to the prison regulation. Id. 
50  Turner, 482 U.S. at 101 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51  O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). In O’Lone, the prisoners were of Islamic faith and 
contended that two prison regulations prevented them attending a Muslim service that was 
offered on Friday afternoons. Id. at 344-45. 
52  Id. at 349 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
53  Id. 
54  Id. at 344. Jumu’ah, meaning “Friday prayer,” is a congregational prayer held by Muslims every 
Friday, just after noon.
55  Id. at 350-52.
56  Id. at 352. Ramadan is the Islamic month of fasting, in which participating Muslims refrain 
from eating, drinking, smoking and sex during daylight hours. It is intended to teach Muslims 
about patience, spirituality, humility and submissiveness to Allah.
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was no obligation that the prison accommodate their desire to attend 
Jumu’ah.57
Cases decided under the Turner/O’Lone tests rarely moved beyond 
the Summary Judgment stage –frequently because of prisons’ defense on 
the basis of safety or budgetary concerns. Under those four factors, courts 
did not focus upon legitimacy of a prisoner’s religion or the strength of 
his or her faith and more on the prison policy or action itself.58 
C. Employment Division v. Smith And 
Legislative Responses Thereto
The 1990s saw a power struggle between the Court’s evolving 
standards related to free exercise and Congressional interest in 
protecting religious freedom. In Employment Division v. Smith, the 
Supreme Court departed from its earlier precedent in Yoder and 
Sherbert.59 Justice Scalia wrote for a 5-4 majority and announced that 
criminalizing peyote use only incidentally burdened two members of 
a Native Americans’ religious beliefs.60 The Court reasoned that there 
was no need to apply strict scrutiny analysis because the standard is 
too stringent for general, neutral laws that are not overtly intended 
to restrict religious beliefs.61 This changed the landscape somewhat – 
and many were dismayed. Professor Douglas Laycock spoke for many 
when he complained, “This Court has said to Americans of all faiths 
that they have a constitutional right to believe their religion but no 
constitutional right to practice it.”62 
The Court distinguished Sherbert and Yoder analysis, limiting 
Sherbert to its factual context as an unemployment benefits case 
involving a system of individualized exemptions.63 It further reasoned 
that Yoder was a “hybrid” case because it affected more than one 
fundamental right (free exercise of religion and the right for parents 
to direct education of their children). No particular standard of review 
57  Id. “By placing the burden on prison officials to disprove the availability of alternatives,” the 
Court explained, “the approach articulated by the Court of Appeals fails to reflect the respect and 
deference that the United States Constitution allows for the judgment of prison administrators.” 
Id. Even further, the Court found that a gathering for Jumu’ah among prisoners could threaten 
prison security and anger other inmates, who would not get to participate in the gathering. Id. at 
352. 
58  For example, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “there is no question that respondent’s 
sincerely held religious beliefs which compelled attendance at Jumu’ah.” Id. at 345. 
59  494 U.S. 872. 
60  Id. Smith and Black were fired from their jobs for using peyote, a sacrament in the Native 
American church in which they were members. Id. at 872. They were subsequently denied 
unemployment benefits by the state of Oregon because they had been dismissed for work-related 
misconduct. Id. The State’s position was that the dismissals were based on criminal drug statutes 
and that the statutes were neutral and generally applicable. Id.
61  Id. at 881-82.
62  Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty, Volume 2: The Free Exercise Clause 58 (2011).
63  Smith, 494 U.S. 872. Here, there was misconduct and plaintiffs were not subject to individualized 
exceptions because they violated Oregon’s controlled substance laws. Id.
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was discussed, but it was clear that scrutiny less than strict scrutiny 
was applied to general, neutrally-applicable laws.64 However, laws not 
generally-applicable or neutral remained subject to the Sherbert/Yoder 
strict scrutiny analysis if it substantially burdened a religion practice.65
D. Free Exercise Power Struggles: Smith, RFRA and RLUIPA
In response to constituents’ outcries, Congress legislatively 
overturned the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith through enactment of RFRA.66 The purpose behind RFRA was 
to return to the pre-Smith analysis of free exercise claims—including, 
presumably (though not explicitly) claims brought by prisoners. More 
specifically, Congress intended to restore the Sherbert/Yoder test by 
subjecting all laws that “substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion” to strict scrutiny, even if the state or local laws were generally 
applicable and neutral.67 In order for the State to survive a free exercise 
challenge brought by a prisoner under RFRA and its more stringent test, 
it had to show not only a compelling interest justifying its substantial 
burden upon free exercise but also that it had employed the “least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.”68 Senator 
Oren Hatch—a co-sponsor of the legislation—described RFRA as one 
of the most significant pieces of legislation to ever come before the 
Congress.”69 
RFRA was controversial, especially as related to prisoners’ religious 
practices. Some argued that it created another series of rights to hardened 
criminals or would flood the court system with frivolous claims. There 
are pages of discussion in the corresponding Congressional Record 
in the Senate regarding the harms RFRA could do to prisons, court 
systems, prisoners, and prison wardens.70 However, some legislators 
clearly thought RFRA could repair the damage the Smith decision had 
exacted upon on religious free exercise.71
The Supreme Court quickly responded to RFRA in Boerne v. Flores,72 
and the power struggle continued.73 It declared RFRA unconstitutional, 
because—although section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave 
Congress the power to enforce certain rights—it did not give Congress 
64  Id. at 881-82.
65  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) 
(applying strict scrutiny analysis to a non-neutral law that substantially burdened Santerian’s 
religious exercise of sacrificing animals). 
66  Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S. §2000bb (1993).
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2000bb-4. 
68 See supra note 13 at 443. 
69  139 Cong. Rec. S 2610 (1993).
70  139 Cong. Rec. 26181-90 (1993). For further discussion of the Congressional Record surrounding 
RFRA, see infra Part VI.
71  139 Cong. Rec. 4922 (daily ed. March 11, 1993) (statements of Sen. Kennedy).
72  Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
73  Gaubatz, supra note 48 at 509. 
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the power to change the substance of what those rights entailed or 
to create new rights.74 Thereafter, RFRA still applied to federal laws, 
but state or local laws were again subject to the Smith analysis.75 For 
prisoners, the effect of the Boerne decision was to restore the less 
restrictive reasonableness standard articulated in Turner and followed 
in O’Lone.76 
E. The Religious Land Use And Institutionalized Persons Act 
Undaunted, Congress initiated RLUIPA legislation less than a month 
after the Court’s decision in Boerne v. Flores. 77 Immediately following 
the decision, legislators held a first series of meetings to consider what 
alternative sources of legislation were available to Congress in order 
to protect against religious discrimination and substantial burdens on 
religious practice.78 One representative noted, “Because the freedom 
to practice one’s religion is a fundamental right, we are meeting this 
morning . . . to consider what sources of authority Congress may utilize 
to protect this most precious freedom from government infringement.” 
79 At some point, the discussion turned to burdens upon religious free 
exercise in land use regulations and denial of religious exercise in state-
run institutions.80 
Though prisoners’ free exercise claims met with little success in the 
federal courts even as late as 2001, RLUIPA’s passage at the turn of the 
century offered promise and hope. Like its predecessor, it “restored” 
a compelling interest test for laws impacting religious practices and 
discarded the previous rational basis test. 81 Enacted under congressional 
Spending Clause powers—rather than the powers invoked for RFRA 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment82—the relevant portion 
of RLUIPA reads, 
No government shall impose a substantial burden on 
the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined 
to an institution. . . even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability, unless the government 
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that 
person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
74  Id. at 530, 532. 
75  See id.
76  Bolin v. Rice, 2000 WL 342676 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
77  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc to -5 (2006).
78  See Protecting Religious Freedom after Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Rep. Canady). 
79  Id.
80  Id.
81  42 U.S.C. § 2000-cc (2001).
82  The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, under which many 
prisoners’ free exercise claims were brought, was found an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ 
powers, and does not apply to the States. Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering 
that compelling governmental interest.83 
RLUIPA applies to any “program or activity that receives Federal 
financial assistance” or when “the substantial burden affects, or removal 
of that burden would affect [] commerce . . . among the several states.” 
84 Thus, RLUIPA applies to prisoners because prisons receive federal 
funding. And at least theoretically, the language of that test offered 
hope for success to prisoners filing religious practice claims. Under 
RLUIPA, if a prisoner is able to demonstrate that a substantial burden 
has been imposed on his or her religious practice, the burden of proof 
then shifts to the State to demonstrate both the existence of a compelling 
governmental interest and that the method complained of is the “least 
restrictive means of furthering” that compelling interest.85 The test 
is markedly more favorable to the prisoner than the Turner v. Safley 
test, under which the prisoner carried the factual burden and through 
which a prison might prevail by showing merely that its policies were 
“‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological interests.”86 
F. RLUIPA’s Constitutionality 
The question of RLUIPA’s constitutionality was always present 
because of the fate of its predecessor.87 In its clearest statement about 
religious practice in prison since its decision in Turner v. Safley, the 
United States Supreme Court in Cutter v. Wilkinson88 not only found 
RLUIPA to be constitutional but also offered guidance related to its 
application to prisoners’ free exercise cases.89 First, the Court “found 
RLUIPA’s institutionalized-persons provision compatible with the 
Establishment Clause because it alleviate[d] exceptional government-
created burdens on private religious exercise.”90 RLUIPA, it continued, 
83  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(b)(1)- (2) (2006).
84  Id. 
85  Id. 
86  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 93 (1987).
87  The amicus curiae briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in Cutter v. Wilkinson supporting 
RLUIPA’s constitutionality and the prisoners’ rights to conform to their religious beliefs 
demonstrate the diversity of RLUIPA’s support. Individuals and organizations filing amicus 
curiae briefs included: the Rutherford Institute, the Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion, 
Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Edward M. Kennedy, the American Correctional Chaplains 
Association, Former state corrections officials, state prisoners, prison fellowship, the Jewish 
Prisoner Services International, the American Catholic Correctional Chaplains Association, the 
Prison Dharma Network, the Nation Association of Evangelicals, the Union of Orthodox Jewish 
Congregation, the states of New York and Washington, and others. Cutter, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
88  544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
89  James D. Nelson, Incarceration, Accommodation, and Strict Scrutiny, 95 Va. L. Rev. 2053, 2059-60 
(2009) (“The Cutter Court affirmed the constitutionality of RLUIPA, holding that the heightened 
standard of review did not impermissibly favor religion.”).
90  Cutter, 544 U.S. 709, 720.
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“thus protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to 
attend to their religious needs” and who are also “therefore dependent 
on the government’s permission and accommodation for exercise 
of their religion.”91 Cutter also reaffirmed that the state must not, in 
its accommodation, confer any “privileged status on any particular 
religious sect” nor should the state “single[] out [any] bona fide faith 
for disadvantageous treatment.”92 And while courts may not enter into 
an inquiry regarding the sincerity of a prisoner’s beliefs or whether “the 
belief or practice in question is ‘compelled by, or central to, a system of 
religious belief,’93 RLUIPA does permit inquiry regarding ‘whether the 
objector’s beliefs are ‘truly held.’”94 
Whether advocating or criticizing, scholars noted that RLUIPA has 
increased prisoner litigants’ opportunities to challenge administrative 
policies that hinder religious practices. Some feared that the RLUIPA 
would result in a flood of prisoner litigants’ claims, predicting that “the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Cutter will most likely result in an increase 
in litigation and thereby burden penological interests.”95
What is generally agreed upon, however, is that RLUIPA was 
an unprecedented legal statement in support of religious practice in 
prison. Never before—whether under a legislative effort or court 
opinion—had prisoners enjoyed such public statements in support 
of their free exercise. After Cutter was decided, Brian Fahling, senior 
trial attorney for the American Family Association Center for Law and 
Policy, quipped ruefully: “It is a sign of the times, I suppose, that it took 
a witch and a Satanist to secure the rights of inmates to worship.”96 
But whether Protestant or wiccan, RLUIPA was supposed to stand for 
the proposition that all prisoners of faith should be able to practice 
according to the dictates of their conscience and would have recourse 
to the federal courts if that was impeded by their custodians.
III. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
In the years that intervened the passage of RFRA and RLUIPA, 
Congress passed another federal law related to civil lawsuits—whether 
or not related to religious practice. Though it has received almost no 
attention in the examination of the success and impact of RLUIPA, this 
little law has had a tremendous influence on whether RLUIPA has 
91  Id. at 721.
92  Id. at 724.
93  Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725, n.13 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(a)); see also Navajo Nation v. U.S. 
Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2007).
94  Ibid. (internal citations omitted).
95  Morgan F. Johnson, Heaven Help Us: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act’s 
Prisoners Provisions in the Aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 14 Am. 
U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 585, 599 (2006). 
96  B.A. Robinson, Religious Freedom Restoration Acts Additional Attempts at Federal Legislation: RLPA 
and RLUIPA, http://www.religioustolerance.org/rfra3.htm (accessed July 19, 2011). 
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proven an effective tool for prisoners litigating about religious free 
exercise. The PLRA was signed into law in April of 1996 as a rider 
within an omnibus appropriations bill97 after Congress was unable 
to pass eight out of thirteen annual federal appropriations bills 
(which led to a brief government shutdown during November and 
December of 1995 and January of 1996).98 Whatever the cause of the 
bill’s quick movement into law99, there were at least some lawmakers 
who were unhappy with the inclusion of the PLRA rider with such 
sparse debate.100 While criticism of appropriations riders in general 
is beyond the scope of this article, two real problems have emerged 
from the passage of the PLRA: (1) a vast decrease in a prisoner’s ability 
to litigate even claims with merit and (2) an increase in litigation over 
the statutory construction of the PLRA.101
A. PLRA And Constitutionality102 
The PLRA, which applies to all prisoners’ federal civil rights cases 
(even RLUIPA and other religious free exercise claims), was enacted 
to better screen prisoner claims and therefore includes a number of 
strict litigation requirements. Its general constitutionality has never 
been considered by the Supreme Court.103 Instead, the Court has 
analyzed cases involving small aspects of the Act and either refined the 
challenged rule or expanded it. 104 
97  Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Bill of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 
Stat. 1321-66 (1996).
98  Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Alter of Appropriations Riders: A 
Constitutional Crisis, 21 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 457, 507-09 (1997). 
99  Giovanna Shay and Johanna Kalb, More Stories of Jurisdiction-Stripping and Executive Power: 
Interpreting the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 291, 300 (2007) (“Passed 
hastily and with scant legislative history, the PLRA represented a moment when state attorneys 
general were able to take advantage of anti-prisoner and anti-activist court sentiment--as well as 
a Republican-controlled Congress--to curtail access to courts.”).
100  142 Cong. Rec. S2296 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy that “[a]lthough a version of the 
PLRA was introduced as a free-standing bill and referred to the Judiciary Committee, it was never 
the subject of a committee mark-up, and there is no Judiciary Committee report explaining the 
proposal. The PLRA was the subject of a single in the Judiciary Committee, hardly the type of 
thorough review that a measure of this scope deserves.”).
101  See generally, Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Enigmatic Exhaustion 
Requirement: What it means and what Congress, the Courts and Correctional Officials Can Learn from it, 
86 Corn. L. Rev. 483 (2001).
102  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997.
103  “The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in only a few of the many cases in 
which federal courts have interpreted the provisions of the PLRA, and in several of these the 
Court discussed general principles of the Act such as the purpose of the Act (§ 4), its movement 
away from a discretionary standard (§ 5), its limitations on injunctive relief (§ 6), and whether 
some provisions of the Act would be applied retroactively (§ 7).” Philip White, Jr., Construction and 
Application of Prison Litigations Reform Act – Supreme Court Cases, 51 A.L.R. Fed.2d 143 (originally 
published in 2010).
104  This can be seen in Woodford v. NGO, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) and Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). 
In these cases, the prisoner-petitioners challenged the exhaustion requirement of PLRA.
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The Act’s “exhaustion” requirement is perhaps the prisoners’ 
most difficult hurdle and is the topic of the most litigation. The PLRA 
provides that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison 
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, 
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility 
until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”105 
The law’s mandatory exhaustion provision replaced the weaker 
requirement in the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Person Act, which 
left discretion with the district courts to determine whether the prisoner 
had exhausted the administrative remedies.106 The changes within 
the PLRA, however, restricts courts’ discretion to find that a prisoner 
has brought all necessary administrative challenges.107 In addition to 
deterring even meritorious prisoner lawsuits, the PLRA has generated 
its own vast litigation about when exhaustion requirements apply and 
what they demand of prisoners.108 
A decade after the PLRA’s enactment, in Woodford v. NGO, the United 
State Supreme Court settled a growing circuit split over the meaning 
of the term “exhaustion.”109 Although the text of the statute does not 
explicitly call for it, Woodford interpreted the PLRA’s administrative 
exhaustion requirement as requiring “proper” exhaustion.110 In the 
105  42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a). Exhaustion of administrative remedies, pursuant to Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (PLRA), is required for all prisoner suits seeking redress for prison circumstances 
or occurrences, regardless of whether they involve general circumstances of incarceration or 
particular episodes. Porter v. Nussle, 122 S. Ct. 983 (2002).
106  Woodford v. NGO, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006). 
107  Not surprisingly, this requirement has made quite an impact upon civil litigation around 
prison conditions. See e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that prisoner 
must exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court); McKinney v. Carey, 311 
F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of inmate’s complaint who was in the process 
of exhausting his administrative remedies); Medina-Claudio v. Rodriguez-Mateo, 292 F.3d 31, 36 
(1st Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal when inmate failed to exhaust the administrative remedies 
in place); Jackson v. Dist. of Columbia, 254 F.3d 262, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal 
of inmates’ complaint because they had begun, but not yet exhausted, the prison grievance 
procedure); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999) (dismissing inmate’s complaint 
brought under RFRA because he filed his federal complaint before allowing the administrative 
process to be completed); Perez v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 538 (7th Cir. 
1999) (remanding for dismissal and reversing the district court’s refusal to dismiss when, at the 
time the district court was ruling on the motion to dismiss, the inmate had fully exhausted his 
administrative remedies but had not done so at the time of filing).
108  Id.
109  Woodford, 548 U.S. at 87. In Woodford, the prisoner had filed a grievance with the prison 
officials. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation rejected the grievance as 
being untimely filed since the prisoner filed the complaint six months after the restriction had 
initially been imposed upon the plaintiff, exceeding California’s 15-working day rule. After an 
unsuccessful appeal to the California Department of Corrections, the prisoner filed suit against 
prison officials. The Ninth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit had interpreted a prisoner to have satisfied 
the PLRA’s ‘exhaustion’ requirement once all administrative remedies were no longer available. 
Id. 
110  Id. at 87. According to the Woodford Majority, the text of the PLRA “strongly suggests” the 
term “exhausted” requires ‘proper’ exhaustion. But the dissent cautions that the Majority’s 
interpretation “essentially ignores the PLRA’s text.”
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wake of that decision, it is not enough that the prisoner has confronted 
prison administrators with his complaint; rather, he must have followed 
the proper procedure in filing grievances and alleging interference with 
religious practice.111 According to one commentator, “the [Woodford] 
decision effectively leaves the ability to define the hurdles a prisoner 
must clear (in the form of prison grievance procedures) in the hands 
of prison officials, making them gate-keepers to both federal and, in 
some jurisdictions, state courts.”112 These gate keepers may review 
technical issues or whether a prisoner used the correct form or named 
the proper official. 
Prior to 2001, the federal circuit courts were also divided on the 
question of whether a prisoner who was seeking only monetary 
damages which could not be obtained through a prison’s grievance 
process must still exhaust all “available” remedies. This Circuit split 
was resolved by Booth v. Churner, in which the Supreme Court held that 
a prisoner who is only seeking monetary damages must still exhaust 
all prison remedies as long as the prison’s grievance committee has 
the authority to take some remedial action. 113 Thus, this issue was 
essentially decided in favor of the prisons, a fact that has militated 
against prisoner claims regardless of their merit.114 
Also controversial is the “physical harm” requirement, particularly 
in the context of First Amendment and RLUIPA claims. 115 As with 
many other civil claims, the injury involved in the denial of the right to 
free exercise of religion is usually not physical; rather, it is emotional or 
spiritual. Applied strictly, this restriction would prevent most prisoners 
from asserting that they have been denied reasonable opportunities to 
practice their religious beliefs.116 Immediately after PLRA’s passage, it 
was used as a defense to a New York prisoner’s free exercise claim.117 
Circuits are split on the issue of physical harm and how to interpret 
it. Some courts have held that it does not apply to some claims. For 
example, in Saheed-Muhammad v. Dipaelo, that district court explained 
that “regardless of actual physical or emotional injury,” if the prisoner’s 
constitutional claim involves “the violation of intangible rights,” the 
111  For one example, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) has an 
administrative grievance system for prisoner complaints. Regs., tit.15 SECTION 3084.1 (2007). 
Before filing suit prisoners must submit a CDC Form 602. There are four separate levels of appeals 
the first of which must be initiated within fifteen working days of the event being appealed. 
California prisoners must follow this process—including the filing of the initial grievance and 
timely appeals to each of the four levels of appeals—in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement 
of § 1997e(a). 
112  Shay and Kalb, supra note 99 at 293. 
113  532 U.S. 731 (2001).
114  Id.
115  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
116  See Stacy Heather O’Brien, Closing the Courthouse Door: The Impact of the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act’s Physical Injury Requirement on the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1189 (1997).
117  Harris v. Lord, 957 F. Supp. 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (at issue here, however, was a question of 
retroactivity and the prisoner’s suit was allowed to continue).
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physical harm subsection simply does “not govern.” 118 The Ninth, Sixth, 
and Seventh Circuits and a number of other district courts have likewise 
made distinctions between constitutional— particularly First Amendment—
claims and other civil claims made by prisoners.119 This subsection has never 
been considered by the Supreme Court, however, and remains a puzzle 
largely left to lower courts to interpret, accept, or reject entirely.
Beyond the PLRA’s general constitutionality and aside from 
questions of exhaustion or application, other provisions of the PLRA 
raise constitutional concerns. For example, one federal district court has 
held that the “three strikes” provision (28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(g)) violates 
the Equal Protection Clause.120 The requirements related to filing fees, 
however, consistently withstand constitutional challenges.121
Still, all of these technical factors have a significant impact upon 
whether a prisoner receives a hearing on the merits, and while some 
have praised the PLRA, others condemn its restrictions. Professor 
Schlanger, who analyzed federal court filings for her scholarship on 
inmate litigation, explains, “The statute has been highly successful in 
reducing litigation, triggering a forty-three percent decline over five 
years, notwithstanding the simultaneous twenty-three percent increase 
in the incarcerated population.” 122 The question of whether this 
effectiveness is appropriate and its unintended impact upon RLUIPA 
litigation is at the heart of the inquiry here.
IV. How Have RLUIPA Claims Really Fared In The Courts 
(And Has PLRA Made An Impact)?
RLUIPA brought with it a good deal of discussion—hype, even—
and raised the hopes of a number of religious practice advocates and 
prisoners themselves. Scholars, both supporters and detractors, have 
discussed various reasons why RLUIPA has been a useful new tool for 
some prisoner litigants. 
118  Saheed-Muhammad v. Dipaelo, 138 F.Supp. 2d 99, 107 (2001) (citing Memphis Community 
School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n. 11 (1986)) (stating that courts should vindicate 
deprivations of certain “absolute” rights that are not shown to have caused actual injury because 
of their fundamental importance in organized society).
119  Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir.1998) (“[t]he deprivation of First Amendment 
rights entitles a plaintiff judicial relief wholly aside from any physical injury he can show, or 
any mental or emotional injury he may have incurred.”); see also Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 
781 (7th Cir.1999) (deprivation of First Amendment rights is a cognizable injury unencumbered 
by requirements of physical, mental or emotional injury); Williams v. Ollis, 230 F.3d 1361 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (the PLRA does not cover First Amendment retaliation claim); Mason v. Schriro, 45 
F.Supp.2d 709, 720 (W.D.Mo.1999) (Equal Protection Claims under the Fourteenth Amendment 
could be brought without allegation of physical harm); Warburton v. Underwood, 2 F.Supp.2d 
306, 315 (W.D.N.Y.1998) (declined to dismiss the plaintiff’s Establishment Clause claim for want 
of proof of physical injury because “such claims nevertheless deserve to be heard”). 
120  Ayers v. Norris, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
121  Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1997); Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 
1997); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1997 F. App. 0059P (6th Cir. 1997).
122  Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1555, 1694 (2003).
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Now, ten years after RLUIPA’s passage and with the benefit of time 
to examine district and circuit cases addressing prisoner lawsuits, the 
result is disappointing. Though, to be fair, RLUIPA has allowed some 
significant victories, under this—the most accommodating test under 
which prisoner free exercises have ever been considered—the overall 
range of outcomes is less than remarkable.
A. A Number Of RLUIPA Cases Have Won On The Merits Or 
Survived Summary Judgment
Over the past decade, a number of RLUIPA cases have been 
successful on the merits with resulting relief for prisoners. Despite the 
disappointments noted and described further in this Article, it would be 
disingenuous not to recognize these cases in which prisoners’ lawsuits 
prevailed because the plaintiffs had been prohibited from worshiping 
as their consciences dictate. 
For one example, the Ninth Circuit’s has acknowledged that prisons may 
still curtail prisoners’ religious freedoms in some instances, but cautioned 
that “in light of RLUIPA, no longer can prison officials justify restrictions on 
religious exercise by simply citing to the need to maintain order and security 
in a prison.” 123 Undoubtedly, this represents a leap in jurisprudence on 
prisoners’ religious practice claims from Turner and O’Lone.
Some categories of cases have been consistently successful, with 
others yielding mixed results. RLUIPA free exercise claims have been 
most successful when a prisoner’s claim has had no reasonable security 
impact, a minimal financial burden upon the prison administration, 
and has involved a core tenet of a prisoner’s religious beliefs. 
For example, possession of religious articles and books have 
frequently been the subject of religious practice lawsuits —under 
the First Amendment Turner test, RFRA, and under RLUIPA. These 
have no perceptible financial impact (since these cases deal with 
possession—not provision—of religious articles) and a limited realistic 
security interest. Under RLUIPA, some federal circuits have granted 
relief, though they failed under other tests. For instance, the victory of 
a Muslim inmate who sued prison officials for prohibiting him from 
possessing prayer oil won relief at both the district and circuit levels 
was unprecedented at the time.124 
Hair and beard length have been other new areas of success for 
123  Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 985 (2008) (where the Ninth circuit found 
that a prison policy outright banning a particular religious practice—regardless of available 
alternatives—constitutes a “substantial [ ] burden” on one’s free exercise).
124  Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003) (denying relief, however, on an additional 
claim related to the prison’s rules restricting the number of religious feasts an inmate may observe 
per year); cf. Borzych v. Frank, 439 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that prison’s ban on white 
supremacist books did not violate RLUIPA).
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many of the same reasons,125 though somewhat surprisingly not in all 
federal circuits.126 It is clear that a few successes would not have been 
possible if not for RLUIPA’s new legal test. For example, California 
prisoners who brought a claim about the right to wear beards won 
relief in the Ninth Circuit. That court was receptive to the prisoners’ 
arguments, determining that the prison had no compelling interest in 
regulating religiously-mandated beards. 127 
Similarly, addressing the issue of the Jumu’ah services, the court 
noted that while the prison’s interest in having a workforce of prisoners 
and a system that encourages participation in that work detail was a 
compelling interest, the policy of punishing Muslim prisoners who 
missed one hour of work detail a week to attend Jumu’ah services was 
not the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.128 The simple 
alternative of simply creating an exemption for Muslims that missed work 
detail while attending Jumu’ah services was clearly more appropriate .129 
Lawsuits related to religiously-mandated diets are perennial ones 
presenting a difficult balancing of interests: of course diet is fundamental 
to the belief of many prisoners, but while it poses no threat to security, 
providing alternative meals can be expensive. For this reason, many 
of these cases have not been successful in the federal courts no matter 
the legal test—Turner, RFRA, or RLUIPA—under which the issue is 
considered. One very recent Circuit court case, though, proved successful 
for a Muslim inmate who alleged a violation of RLUIPA for failure to 
provide a halal diet. 130 Likewise, once a prison provides a religious diet 
to prisoners, they may not be denied that accommodation without 
reasonable justification. When, for instance, a prisoner was removed from 
the prison’s list of Ramadan participants after a guard filed a report that 
he had broken the fast, his RLUIPA claim against the prison won relief.131 
125  Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005) (granting Native American inmate granted 
relief in the Ninth Circuit over the prison’s grooming and hair length policies because of the substantial 
burden on his religious practice and limited financial and security impact inmates’ long hair).
126  Thunderhorse v. Pierce, 364 F. App’x 141 (5th Cir. 2010) (reasoning that the hair length policy 
substantially burdened plaintiff’s religious exercise but was the lease restrictive means of a 
compelling governmental interest in prison security). 
127  Mayweathers v. Terhune, 328 F. Supp. 2d. 1086, 1088 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (reasoning that a half-
inch beard made a prisoner no more difficult to identify, and therefore the risk of a bearded 
prisoner being able to escape unnoticed was exaggerated and the regulation was an overreaction). 
128  Id.
129  Id.
130  Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2010) (“DOC” substantially burdened the 
inmates religious exercise by refusing to offer the prisoner a halal diet); see also Willis v. Comm‘r, 
Indiana Dept. of Corr., 2010 WL 4457432 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 1, 2010) (stating that denial of kosher 
diets substantially burdened inmate’s religious exercise and increased costs of providing kosher 
meals to inmates is not a “compelling interest”).
131  Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174,188 (4th Cir. 2006) (“An inmate…could decide not to be religious 
about fasting and still be religious about other practices, such as congregational services or group 
prayer. Such an inmate’s right to religious exercise is substantially burdened by a policy, like the 
one here, that automatically assumes that lack of sincerity with respect to one practice means lack 
of sincerity with respect to others.”). 
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Not all prisoners’ RLIUPA claims have been caught in the net 
of summary judgment. But this does not necessarily foreshadow 
ultimate success; many of those cases surviving summary judgment 
do so because of incomplete or insufficient factual records precluding 
summary judgment for either party.132 A number of prisoners’ cases 
have moved forward because of their ability to exhaust administrative 
remedies.133 Still, in more factually complex circumstances there is 
perhaps an indication that the courts are exhibiting a diminishing 
deference to prison officials’ judgment.134 
B. Despite RLUIPA’s Promise, Prisoners Remain Disappointed
While the passage of RLUIPA foreshadowed an increase in 
successful prisoners’ claims, a consistent trend of that sort has yet to 
emerge in the courts. The success described above notwithstanding, 
RLUIPA has not been the “magic bullet” of free exercise in prison. In 
“RLUIPA at Four,” an early article (and arguably the most important) 
on the topic, the author described that at the time of publication only 
seven out of forty RLUIPA cases had been dismissed. 135 And in a piece 
critical of RLUIPA’s application to prisoners, the author asserts that 
“an assessment of actual RLUIPA actions reveals that the majority of 
prisoners’ claims are successful, even when important penological 
interest are at stake.”136 Both claims are drastically overstated and 
oversimplified. Instead of considering the outcomes not favorable to a 
prisoners’ claim—such as a loss at summary judgment—both speedily 
leaps to the conclusion that all thirty three cases involving RLUIPA and 
prisoners were granted relief of some sort. This was not the case then 
and is not the case to date.
132  Jova v. Smith, 582 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the grant of summary judgment for the 
defendants was improper because the District Court did not consider whether the institution’s 
practices in restricting the inmates’ diets and group worship satisfied the least restrictive means 
standard); Sample v. Lappin, 424 F.Supp.2d 187 (D.D.C. 2006) (refusing to grant summary 
judgment, as genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the outright ban on Sample’s 
consumption of wine was the least restrictive means of furthering the government’s compelling 
interest in controlling intoxicants). 
133  Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2009) (showing that a prisoner who fully exhausted his 
administrative remedies and did not encounter problems under the PLRA, having the defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment vacated on the RLUIPA claim); Orafan v. Goord, 411 F.Supp.2d 
153 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that although the defendants, in seeking summary judgment, alleged 
that the plaintiffs had not properly exhausted their administrative remedies, the district court 
found that these remedies were properly exhausted, allowing the court to reach the plaintiffs’ 
RLUIPA claims); Pugh v. Goord, 571 F.Supp.2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that the plaintiffs had 
fully and properly exhausted their administrative relief thus denying the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment and the PLRA proved no obstacle to the plaintiffs’ RLUIPA claim proceeding).
134  Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F. 3d 878 (9th Cir. 2008) (where, for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that summary judgment was improper after finding that the practice of Halal was a 
religious exercise that was substantially burdened by prison policies).
135  Gaubatz, supra note 48, at 515. 
136  Johnson, supra note 95, at 599-600. 
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The PLRA has had a consistent and consistently-overlooked 
negative impact upon prisoners’ success in religious practice litigation. 
The text of RLUIPA promises a better and more accommodating legal 
test, but the PLRA has had the effect of stopping many claims before 
they could be considered under the RLUIPA test. And no wonder: 
“[t]he PLRA,” writes Margo Schlanger, “emboldens prison and jail 
officials to make objectionable arguments that must be litigated, 
forcing expenditure of resources and prolonging litigation, as well 
as further dehumanizing prisoners and promoting a culture of 
callousness.”137
Disappointingly, a large number of cases have failed to move 
beyond the PLRA screening process or failed at the summary 
judgment stage. Consider the Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence on the 
topic. As arguably the most diverse and progressive federal circuit, 
the Ninth Circuit has seen an abundance of RLUIPA litigation and 
generated most of the hallmark opinions on the topic. However, of 
the twenty-two prisoner RLUIPA cases that the Ninth Circuit saw 
between 2009 and 2010, none of them won ultimate relief. Eleven 
were defeated by summary judgment, four were dismissed, and 
three were eventually defeated on appeal.138 Only four remaining 
cases have a chance of relief, but these are still awaiting final 
judgment.139 Also, of the 97 RLUIPA claims considered by the Ninth 
Circuit between 2007 and 2008, every single one was dismissed or 
denied, extinguishing the prisoner-litigants’ chances of relief from 
the judicial system.140 
Look, too, within the jurisprudence of the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals. From 2009 to 2010, that circuit saw sixteen RLUIPA prisoner 
claims; among them, five were defeated by summary judgment, two 
were denied relief, two were dismissed. 141 Only one received ultimate 
relief, and six still wait in hope that they might see positive results. 142
1. “Legal” Victories Without Policy Changes
True relief—the freedom to practice as a prisoner’s conscience 
dictates—requires more than mere appellate court success. Even when a 
prisoner’s RLUIPA claim is successful on the merits, the implementation 
137  Margo Schlanger, Preserving the Rule of Law in American’s Jails and Prisons: The Case for Amending 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 139, 145 (2008). 
138  Search query used: advanced: RLUIPA & DA (aft 12-31-2008 & bef 01-01-2011) and narrowing 
results to the 9th Circuit and prisoner claims.
139  Search query used: advanced: RLUIPA & DA (aft 12-31-2008 & bef 01-01-2011) and narrowing 
results to the 9th Circuit and prisoner claims. 
140  Search query used: advanced: RLUIPA & DA (aft 12-31-2006 & bef 01-01-2009) and narrowing 
results to the 9th Circuit and prisoner claims. 
141  Search query used: advanced: RLUIPA & DA (aft 12-31-2008 & bef 01-01-2011) and narrowing 
results to the 1st Circuit and prisoner claims. 
142  Id. 
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of new regulations (or inadequacy of new policies intended to address 
the problems complained of) has also sparked new RLUIPA claims. 
Because RLUIPA does not require every prison within a system to 
implement the changes required by one prisoner’s successful lawsuit, 
progress has not been uniformly applied. Also, even when the prisoner 
has successfully won a RLUIPA claim on the merits, seeing the fruits of 
that success can raise issues as well. In Washington v. Klem, for example, 
after entering into a settlement agreement, the plaintiff was unable to 
enforce it and his motions to the court had no perceptible impact.143 
Charles v. Verhagen is another example of a case that won on the merits 
but in which the prisoner ultimately got no relief; because the type of 
prayer oil allowed by the prison after his successful lawsuit was not the 
variety he required, the prisoner initiated follow-on litigation that was 
ultimately unsuccessful.144
2. Losses At Summary Judgment On Substantive Issues
Many RLUIPA claims fail because the prison policies are 
either deemed not a substantial burden on the prisoners’ religious 
practice145 or the policy is justified by a compelling government 
interest—typically still prison security and budgetary concerns.146 
While a prisoner may argue that his religious practices are being 
substantially burdened by a regulation upon personal possessions, 
diet and group worship,147 many courts are not sympathetic when 
there exists an unrestricted alternative means to a specific religious 
practice.148 In many instances, a prison’s implementation of a policy 
banning a practice or a prison’s refusal to accommodate an inmate’s 
beliefs have been found lawful even under RLUIPA’s test (when, for 
example, failure to accommodate a group worship service was found 
to be due to a lack of volunteer resources rather than an overt policy 
banning the assembly.) 149 Security concerns—however important 
and legitimate—may still be used as prison wardens’ legal trump 
cards on issues whose impact on security is distant at best. Where, for 
example, an inmate has professed a desire to have access to certain 
religious objects or materials, some courts have still been reluctant to 
143  388 F. App’x 85, 85-85 (2010) (after entering into a settlement agreement, plaintiff filed a pro se 
motion to enforce the agreement and to be appointed council. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
District Court’s denial of the motions because the plaintiff failed to file the supporting documents 
expounding his reasons for seeking enforcement of the settlement). 
144  348 F.3d 601 (2003).
145  Watkins v. Shabazz, 180 F.App’x 773 (C.A. 9th 2006). 
146  Keen v. Noble, 2007 WL 1080849 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
147  Hall v. Ekpe, 2011 WL 2600514 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming the District Court’s summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants after the Supreme Court held states do not waive their 
sovereign immunity merely because they accepted federal funds).
148  Stavenjord v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 2007 WL 215816, at *5 (D. Ariz. 2007).
149  Smith v. Kyler, 295 F. App’x 479 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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meet the prisoner’s requests, finding instead that the prison’s need for 
security was a compelling interest.150 
As foreshadowed earlier, many prisoners’ claims dealing with 
religious dietary requirements fail to move beyond the summary 
judgment stage because of the existence of alternative diet programs 
provided by prisons.151 A number of these cases upheld prisons’ 
refusals to provide inmates with Halal152 or Kosher food because of the 
availability of foods that the prisons and courts deemed satisfactory 
substitutes. 153 For example, though a prisoner may prefer a hot Kosher 
meal, repetitive (identical) cold Kosher meals were found to satisfy 
a prisoner’s religiously-mandated diet.154 Prisoner claims revolving 
around religious dietary requirements have also failed to move beyond 
the summary judgment stage for other reasons such as a court’s 
determination that the prison’s failure to provide a Kosher meal to a 
non-Jewish inmate does not violate RLUIPA155 and the court’s deference 
to a magistrate judge’s determination that an inmate had not exhausted 
his remedies with respect to allegations involving halal meat.156 
As was the case under the Turner and O’Lone’s—but now with 
the added hurdles of PLRA—when a claim moves beyond the initial 
screening stages, prison officials still to seek summary judgment or 
defend cases on the merits by simply offering better and better-justified 
explanations for policies based on security or budgetary concerns.157 
150  Keen, 2007 WL 10808 (E.D. Cal 2007) (holding that the compelling interest in security of the 
prison outweighed the prisoner’s interest in building a “hof”); see also Jones v. Schriro, 2006 WL 
2772641 (D. Ariz. 2006) (deciding that even if the prison regulation was a substantial burden 
upon the prisoner’s religious practice, the prison’s compelling interest in security outweighed); 
Brunskill v. Boyd, 141 F. App’x 771 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the prison’s hair length policy 
and limitation on possession of religious articles were the least restrictive means of furthering the 
institute’s compelling interests in security, health, and safety of its staff).
151  See supra at Section V. A. 
152  Defined as sanctioned by Islamic law; selling or serving food ritually fit according to Islamic 
law. Webster’s Dictionary, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/halal.
153  Watkins v. Shabazz, 180 F. App’x 773 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that the existence of both a 
vegetarian diet program and an option to purchase Halal meat at a de minimus cost to the prison 
with no cost to the prisoner precluded the prisoner from claiming that his religious practice was 
substantially burdened by the prison’s failure to provide Halal meat); see also Sefeldeen v. Alameida, 
238 F. App’x 204 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that the district court properly granted summary judgment 
because the prison had provided two alternatives to eating Halal meat—a vegetarian equivalent 
or the choice of finding a religious organization outside the prison willing to provide Halal meat); 
Muhammed v. Sapp, 388 F. App’x 892 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment for the prison 
when “alternative” or vegan meals—but not requested meals— were offered to Muslim inmates). Id.
154  Kretchmar v. Beard, 241 F. App’x 863 (3d Cir. 2007). 
155  Linehan v. Crosby, 346 F. App’x 471 (11th Cir. 2009) (granting summary judgment for the 
prison because failure to provide a Kosher meal to a non-Jewish inmate does not violate RLUIPA.) 
156  Jihad v. Fabian, 680 F.Supp.2d 1021 (D. Minn. 2010) (determing that a prisoner must adhere to 
the agency’s grievance process to exhaust administrative remedies).
157  See e.g., Rouser v. White, 2010 WL 2541268 (C.A. 9 2010) (the defendants claimed he had not 
exhausted all of the administrative remedies and that the plaintiff’s claims were improperly joined). 
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3. Prisoners’ Losses On Technical PLRA Issues
The exhaustion and screening requirements of the PLRA make it 
extremely difficult for a prisoner to file suit, much less prevail upon the 
merits of a case.158 Before even reaching the PLRA’s statutorily mandated 
screening process, it is not uncommon for a prisoner’s claim to be dismissed 
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies—especially given the 
judicially-engrafted procedural default rule.159 The PLRA’s exhaustion 
requirement provides an affirmative defense where the defendant has the 
burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.160 Consider the 
“Woodford Rule”—a confusing rule if ever there was one—allowing, as 
one commentator explained, “a prisoner’s mistakes in the prison grievance 
system to scuttle potential federal constitutional claims.”161 Obviously, a 
dismissal on technical grounds frequently precludes federal courts from 
ever reaching the merits of cases involving the arguable violation of a 
constitutional right that has been—at least outside the prison context— 
historically and vigilantly guarded. 
In many prisoners’ RLUIPA cases, reviewing courts (both at the trial 
and appellate levels) have held that a failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies warranted summary judgment in the prisons’ favor.162 In 
these cases, prisoner-litigants’ errors left no room for amendment 
and re-filing; the PLRA requirements were absolute. A sampling of 
California cases reveals that, in the first half of 2010 alone, a significant 
number of prisoner complaints were dismissed for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies.163 Additionally, a non-exhaustive survey of 
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement upon RLUIPA claims reveals a 
broad swath of dismissals or denials.164 Even in the cases in which the 
158  Kimbrough v. California, 609 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2010) (under the PLRA, prisoner-plaintiffs 
could not be awarded attorneys’ fees in RLUIPA claim). 
159  See, e.g., Mathis v. Knowles, 81 F. App’x 906 (9th Cir. 2003).
160  Mello v. Martinez, 2010 WL 118394, at * 2 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
161  Shay and Kalb, supra note 99, at 293.
162  See e.g., Lindell v. Casperson, 360 F.Supp.2d 932 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (Wiccan inmate’s claims 
failed at summary judgment after he failed to exhaust administrative remedies under PLRA); 
Couch v. Jabe, 479 F.Supp.2d 569 (W.D. Va. 2006) (Muslim prisoner’s claim was dismissed for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Rogers v. U.S., 696 F.Supp.2d 472 (W.D. Pa. 2010) 
(Muslim inmates sued prison officials for selling scented oils used in Muslim services at too high a 
cost, but defendants were granted summary judgment because of the Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies).
163  See, e.g., Mello, 2010 WL 118394 (holding that the prisoner failed to state a cognizable claim); 
see also, Comundoiwilla v. Evans, No. 1:04-cv-06721-LJO-YNP PC, 2010 WL 669097 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 
23, 2010) (ordering plaintiff to file an amended complaint or face dismissal of the non-cognizable 
claims); Phillips v. Ayers, No. CV 07-2897-DDP (SH), 2010 WL 1947015 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (denying 
defendant’s motion to dismiss prisoner’s RLUIPA claim).
164  See Maddox v. Love, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17680 (dismissal affirmed because of the plaintiff’s 
failure to exhaust administrative grievance by naming on his grievance form who was alleged to 
have violated his rights); Nifas v. Beard, 374 F. App’x 241 (3d Cir. 2010) (RLUIPA claim dismissed 
for failure to exhaust administrative grievance procedure); Seneca v. Arizona, 345 F. App’x 226, 
(9th Cir. 2009) (administrative grievance filed was too general and did not exhaust state remedies); 
Thomas v. Parker, 318 F. App’x 626 (10th Cir. 2009).
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prisoner won ultimate relief, it was hard-fought and delayed through 
extended litigation over technical PLRA requirements. Several cases 
were unsuccessful in the lower courts because of a purported failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies, and only after favorable review in a 
circuit court of appeals were then permitted to litigate on the merits. 165
The PLRA’s screening requirement that a prisoner must state a 
cognizable claim creates another barrier for pro se litigants seeking 
access to the courts.166 In order to avoid dismissal as “frivolous,” the 
plaintiff must craft a complaint with “an arguable legal and factual 
basis.”167 Similarly, in order to avoid dismissal for failure to state claim, 
the plaintiff must craft a complaint that, on one hand, contains more 
than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”168 but, 
on the other hand, satisfies the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 8 
pleading requirement of a “short and plain statement showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.”169 Specifically, for a claim for relief under 
RLUIPA to be cognizable, the “plaintiff must link any RLUIPA claim 
together with specific defendants and specific conduct.”170 Crafting an 
intelligible complaint that ties critical facts to the relevant theory, and 
is simply, concisely and directly stated, is a difficult task for even the 
most sophisticated advocate. For a prisoner with limited literacy skills, 
education, access to legal research materials, and meager financial 
resources, these litigation demands are especially burdensome.171 For 
these reasons it is not surprising that prisoners proceeding pro se 
would have difficulty stating cognizable claims under RLUIPA.
Further, on the very face of the subsection describing the restriction, 
the PLRA’s physical injury or physical harm requirement seems to exempt 
165  See, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2009); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197 
(2d Cir. 2004); DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2004).
166  Shay and Kalb, supra note 99, at 293. 
167  See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (applying to in forma pauperis complaints 
the framework used for evaluating legal frivolousness in appeals); cf. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 
F.2d 1221,1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984) (adopting a frivolousness standard requiring in forma pauperis 
complaints to have “arguable substance in law and fact).
168  See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (holding that although detailed 
factual allegations are unnecessary, the complaint must state enough facts to establish the basis 
for relief beyond the speculative level).
169  F.R.C.P. 8(a)(2); Mayfield v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 529 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2008) (summary 
judgment for the prison affirmed because the remedy sought was held to be barred by the PLRA).
170  See Rider v. Felker, No. CIV S-09-0637 DAD P, 2010 WL 458915, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2010) 
(dismissing plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim because it contained only general allegations that defendants 
had interfered with his religious exercise).
171  Paula Hannaford-Agor and Nicole Mott, Research of Self-Represented Litigation: Preliminary 
Results and Methodological Considerations, 24 The Justice System Journal, Vol. 2 (2003) (“The many 
aspects that make up a civil, or even criminal, trial tend to increase the already heavy burden 
pro se litigants face when even choosing to file a civil claim. For example, after filing a suit, the 
litigant must arrange for service of process, conduct discovery, schedule hearings, file motions, 
and eventually present evidence at trial. These are all aspects of a trial that laypeople “rarely have 
access or the opportunity to develop.”).
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all RLUIPA claims from even remaining in court.172 Though in practice not 
all courts have interpreted the PLRA to apply to religious free exercise 
claims, it has still proved an impediment in a number of federal circuits. 173
____________________________
These are realities consistently overlooked in literature on the topic 
of RLUIPA litigation. Despite its exhaustive discussion of many other 
features of the law and its impact, RLUIPA at Four fails to truly address 
the implication that the Prison Litigation Reform Act has on prisoners 
bringing civil lawsuits through RLUIPA. That Article, for example, 
devotes a mere three sentences addressing the fact that the PLRA is 
applicable to RLUIPA claims, and merely states that prisoners should 
properly pleaded claims within the complaints.174 
But it is no wonder that the impact of the PLRA has been little-
studied: only the cases moving beyond the administrative and lower 
court stages result in reported opinions. These only scratch the surface 
of RLUIPA claims in general; others—especially cases dismissed on 
technical grounds—would hardly arouse the interest of anyone who 
not looking to lower court case or outcomes. Further, because the PLRA 
includes punitive measures for successive petitions (for example, the 
loss of “good time” credits), it may inhibit prisoners from ever filing suit 
in the first place. Rousing the courage to file a legal claim against one’s 
custodian may be sufficiently intimidating to prevent prisoners with 
legitimate claims to initiate them in the first place. It is nearly impossible, 
therefore, to calculate the number of claims that have been ensnared by 
district and lower states courts because of the PLRA or other substantial 
issues or that are never even filed because of the daunting nature of the 
litigation process. The language of RLUIPA indisputably offers a legal 
test more friendly to prisoners’ claims and there has indeed been some 
progress from that perspective. Change, if it has come at all, has come 
slowly, at great price, and in relatively limited areas of the law.
V. What’s The Problem? What’s The Solution?
A. Comparing Public Rhetoric With Private Intent 
(Did Congress Understand PLRA’s Limitation On RLUIPA 
Litigation?) 
On its face, RLUIPA is the second legislative attempt of a Congress 
172  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see Section IV.A infra.
173  Mayfield v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 529 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Jennifer D. Larson, 
RLUIPA, Distress, and Damages, 74 Chi. L. Rev. 1443, 1458 (2007) (“A prisoner who suffered some 
physical harm would be allowed to recover damages for accompanying mental and emotional 
distress, but a prisoner who suffered serious violations of his constitutional or statutory rights 
without any physical harm would be unable to collect any damages. When the right violated is 
RLUIPA’s statutory right of free exercise of religion, such a result is deeply problematic.”). 
174  Gaubatz, supra note 48, at 539.
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seemingly determined to Americans’ free exercise rights—even 
those of prisoners.175 The Department of Justice’s Statement on the 
Institutionalized Persons Provisions of RLUIPA declared its concern 
about Congressional findings that prisoners and others residing in 
prisons, jails, or mental institutions are subjected to discriminatory or 
arbitrary denial of the ability to practice their faiths. 176 
Looking back a few years, however, history tells a slightly more 
nuanced story. Although there was widespread support for restoring 
the compelling interest test as a way to safeguard the First Amendment 
right to free exercise,177 RFRA’s legislative history reveals sharp 
divisions among lawmakers when it came to extending heightened 
protection to prisoners’ free exercise claims. Vigorous debate 
surrounded who was to be included and who was to be excluded from 
RFRA. Senator Reid introduced an amendment that would have fully 
excluded the prison population from claiming heightened scrutiny for 
religious claims under RFRA.178 Growing concern over the increase 
in prisoner litigation in the federal court,179 fear that the Act would 
strip away the long-recognized deference granted to prison officials 
and interfere with prison administration,180 and skepticism about 
prisoner’s claims are the primary reasons why the Reid Amendment 
received strong support from some many members of Congress.181 
As Senator Jesse Helms put it, RFRA’s unamended passage would 
mean that “inmates will be provided much greater latitude to assault 
legitimate prison authority, by masking disobedience under the guise 
of special privileges for religious observation.” 182 While the issue of 
its application to prisoners nearly cost RFRA its passage, proponents 
175  See 146 Cong. Rec. S7774, S7775, July 27, 2000, (joint statement of Sens Hatch and Kennedy). 
176  Dept. of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice on the Institutionalized Persons 
Provisions of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) (2010) 
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/RLUIPA10thAnnivSPLQAs.pdf.
177  139 Cong. Rec. S26408 (1993) (statement of Senator Simpson stating “there is not a single thing 
that has come up in this debate that should lead anyone to believe that anything other than that 
we all believe in religious freedom for everybody.”). 
178  139 Cong. Rec. 26194 (1993) (“Nothwithstanding any other provision of this act, nothing in 
this Act or any amendment made by this Act shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any 
way address that portion of the First Amendment regarding laws prohibiting the free exercise of 
religion, with respect to any individual who is incarcerated in a federal, state, or local correctional, 
detention, or penal facility (including any correctional, detention, or penal facility that is operated 
by a private entity under a contract with a government).”).
179  See 139 Cong. Rec. S26181 (1993) (pointing out that more federal civil cases were brought by 
prisoners in 1992 than federal criminal cases were initiated by the government). 
180  See 139 Cong. Rec. S26409 (1993) (expressing concern that the “least restrictive meants” 
standard for accommodation as determined by the courts could in practice lead to higher costs 
and disruptions in security). 
181  139 Cong. Rec. S26408 (1993). The legislative history for the floor debates discussing the 
proposed amendment are rife with comments made by proponents of the Amendment like 
this of Senator Simpson, “This Amendment would exempt prisons and prisoners to avoid the 
extraordinary creativity of people who spend their time figuring out how to concoct a new 
religion. . . .” Id.
182  139 Cong. Rec. S14515 (1993).
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of the amendment failed to persuade their colleagues that without the 
Reid Amendment, RFRA would “open the floodgates for prisoner’s 
religion-based claims.”183 
Why, then, of all areas of religious freedom to salvage from the 
much-broader (but unconstitutional) RFRA, did Congress focus upon 
land use and institutionalized persons? Why does RLUIPA’s legislative 
history involve so little controversy (as had existed before RFRA’s 
passage) over its application to prisoners? The Congressional record 
reveals precious little to answer these questions, but it seems mightily 
significant that the PLRA had been passed in the interval.184 
The serious and increasing concern over increased prisoner 
litigation, after all, had not died with the proposed Reid amendment 
to RFRA. A few years later, Senator Oren Hatch spoke as one of the 
PLRA’s sponsors and explained, “[Some] prison lawsuits may seem 
far-fetched, almost funny, but unfortunately . . . frivolous lawsuits 
by prisoners tie up the courts, waste valuable resources, and . . . [the 
PLRA] prohibits prisoners from suing for mental or emotional abuse, 
absent a prior showing of physical injury.”185 
It follows, then, that because of the passage of the PLRA, Congress 
seemed far less concerned about RLUIPA’s possible “floodgate of 
litigation.” Although at least one critic feared that RLUIPA would 
result in “excessive litigation and unacceptable threats to important 
penological interests,” that was not the view shared by many voting 
members of Congress.186 
In addition to the explicit reference in the bill’s text, some supporters 
of RLUIPA specifically referred the Prison Litigation Reform Act during 
debates: “[t]his provision does not require prison officials to grant 
religious requests that would undermine prison discipline, order, and 
security. . . . Thus, the courts will continue to be able to reject frivolous 
lawsuits with ease.”187 As Congressman Nadler observed, presciently, 
“This bill limits the rights of prison inmates to raise otherwise valid 
claims under the bill by specifically referencing the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act.”188 The existence of the PLRA likely explains the absence 
of acrimonious debate about the litigious nature of prisoners and the 
dangerous effect RLUIPA would have on prison administration.189 
183  139 Cong. Rec. S26407 (1993). 
184  146 Cong. Rec. S7779 (2000) (statement of Senator Reid voicing his ongoing concern about 
extending heightened scrutiny to prisoners’ free exercise claims, “[w]hile I continue to believe that 
we should not extend the privilege of a strict scrutiny standard to restrictions on the free exercise 
of religion behind the bars of our nation’s prisons, I also recognize certain other realities.”). 
185  154 Cong. Rec. S14626 (1995). 
186  Johnson, supra note 95, at 587.
187  146 Cong. Rec. S7777 (2000) (statement of Melissa Rogers, General Counsel for Baptist Joint 
Committee on Public Affairs).
188  145 Cong. Rec. H5598 (1999) (statement of Rep. Nadler).
189  146 Cong. Rec. S7779 (2000) (statement of Sen. Reid conceding that he still harbors concerns 
about extending strict scrutiny to prisons).
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In fact, the PLRA effectively created a “carve-out” for prisoners’ 
claims, leading to an outcome not unlike what was advocated for and 
envisioned under the proposed Reid Amendment to RFRA.190 
Some members of Congress foresaw the PLRA’s limitations on 
RLUIPA’s application to prisoners as a negative point, but this was 
a minority view. Congressman Nadler, for one, said publicly that he 
would urge his colleagues to vote against the RLUIPA bill if the PLRA 
were specifically referenced or if the PLRA’s application were not in 
some way limited to certain claims.191Others, previously critical of 
RFRA, threw their support behind RLUIPA. 192 
Across the board—from floor debates to the Supreme Court’s 
consideration of its constitutionality—RLUIPA was far less controversial 
than its predecessor RFRA. However, that the PLRA was specifically 
referenced and acknowledged makes it questionable that Congress 
ever intended a flood of prisoners’ religious practice claims, much less 
a flood of successful ones. Beyond the practical realities of being pro se 
litigants, RLUIPA’s protection of prisoners’ religious practice has been 
severely hindered by the PLRA requirements. One Congressman noted 
that “[t]his bill limits the right of prison inmates to raise otherwise valid 
claims under the bill by specifically referencing the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act.” 193 This same Congressman warned he would urge his 
colleagues to vote against the RLUIPA bill if the PLRA was specifically 
referenced, or the PLRA’s application was not in some way limited to 
certain claims.194 However, as one scholar convincingly notes, Congress 
made no attempt to reconcile the apparent PLRA and RLUIPA conflicts 
before RLUIPA’s enactment.195
What then, did Congress actually intend with its passage of RLUIPA? 
Did members of Congress fully understand that prisoners’ claims would 
be caught in the PLRA’s nets of administrative remedies, potential punitive 
measures for “successive” petitions, and other detailed and complicated 
limitations on civil rights lawsuits? Whether or not Congress understood 
the impact on the ground and in the courts, it clearly intended the PLRA 
to apply. Even it had not specifically been referenced in the text of the law 
itself and in the floor debates, courts would have presumed Congress to 
intend the PLRA’s application to RLUIPA.196 
Congress, in considering RLUIPA, clearly responded to (bipartisan) 
190  145 Cong. Rec. H5598 (1999) (statement of Rep. Nadler admitting that the PLRA is a carve-out 
for prisoners’ free exercise claims).
191  Id.
192  See 146 Cong. Rec. S7775 (2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch encouraging passage of RLUIPA).
193  145 Cong. Rec. H5598 (1999) (daily ed. July 15, 1999) (statement of Rep. Nadler).
194  Id.
195  See Jennifer D. Larson, RLUIPA, Distress, and Damages, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1443, 1453-59 (2007) 
(discussing the numerous inherent conflicts between a statute designed to preserve rights and one 
aimed at limiting remedies).
196  Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608 (1980) (“The courts are not at liberty to pick and 
choose among Congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is 
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constituencies supporting the bill. Although its primary backing came 
from the “usual suspects” of prisoners’ rights groups and ACLU 
lobbyists, other smaller groups endorsed it as well.197 One of the 
main lobbyist groups supporting RLUIPA was Friends Committee 
on National Legislation (FCNL), a Quaker lobbyist group.198 But did 
these constituencies fully understand the likely impact the PLRA 
would have upon the substance of the prisoners’ claims? Probably not. 
Gaubatz’s discussion of RLUIPA describes the statute as a “remarkable 
departure” from the legislatures and courts’ previous attempts to 
restrict prisoners’ legal rights.199 Still, decisions on the merits are rare, 
with actual relief for the prisoner even more so. 
Legal impediments—such as the PLRA and the typical absence of 
counsel—greatly limit many prisoners’ ability to challenge, through 
litigation, prison policies and regulations that curtail their ability to 
practice as their consciences dictate. RLUIPA’s alleged intended effect 
of helping pro se prisoners bring their free exercise claims—is obviously 
diminished by these hurdles. Surviving summary judgment is a cold 
comfort and says little about changing policies, programs, or legal 
standards. For all the helpful language and bipartisan political rhetoric, 
unless a policy challenged or an impediment complained of is actually 
removed, RLUIPA has not been nearly as successful as prisoners once 
hoped. Whether a case survives a motion for summary judgment is an 
interesting academic question. A review of which cases actually grant 
the prisoners resolution and relief, however, is the truer test of the law. 
And those successes have been hard-fought and rare indeed.
Whether Congressional passage of RLUIPA was a legitimate 
effort to more fully accommodate the imprisoned faithful or a safely-
cynical passage of a popular law never intended to have much of an 
impact, RLUIPA has been a disappointment. Ten years later, there have 
of course been inroads made and progress pushed, but most of this 
development falls short of RLUIPA’s shining promise.
the duty of the court, absent a clearly expressed Congressional intention to the contrary, to regard 
each as effective.”).
197  See, e.g., Pat Nolan, Victory for Religion Behind Bars, Christianity Today (June 2, 2005), http://
www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2005/juneweb-only/42.0.html (accessed July 19, 2011) (noting 
that Cutter v. Wilkinson was a “tremendous victory for those who work to transform the lives of 
inmates through faith” and also noted that faith is usually not encouraged in prisons due to the 
“extra work”).
198  Friends Committee on National Legislation, Congress Moves to Protect the Free Exercise of Religion, 
http://fcnl.org/resources/newsletter/oct00/congress_moves_to_protect_the_free_exercise_of_
religion/ (accessed July 19, 2011). This group praises Congress for protecting the religious liberty 
of individuals.
199  See Gaubatz, supra note 48 at 504 (contrasting RLUIPA’s creation of rights to the previous trend 
among courts and legislatures to restrict those rights).
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B. Recommendations & Proposed Amendments To PLRA
The strong bipartisan support initially rallied for RLUIPA’s passage 
must now be focused towards remedying RLUIPA’s relatively unknown 
“PLRA problem.” Courts cannot change how the PLRA restricts RLUIPA, 
since the actual text makes PLRA restrictions explicitly applicable. The 
political process may be the only real remedy for this problem—but 
only once the groups that supported its passage understand what has 
happened in the courts since the bill was signed into law. 
If Congress truly intended to protect prisoners from institutional 
restrictions of their religious liberties, then two primarily remedies 
present themselves. Beyond repealing the entire PLRA (which 
seems unlikely given the strength of concern over frivolous prison 
litigation),200 Congress could specifically exempt RLUIPA claims from 
PLRA restrictions or it could amend the PLRA to ensure that more 
claims can be fully litigated in court. 
Whatever future legislative efforts may entail, any attempts to 
soften the impacts of the PLRA generally or specifically in relation 
to RLUIPA should address the PLRA’s burden. Each of these is an 
impediment on its own, but taken together are daunting and frequently 
fatal to even substantial RLUIPA litigation. Some of the hurdles that 
prisons must jump through include filing fees and screening processes 
and the physical injury requirement that PLRA places on them. These 
recommendations include a number of amendments. 
Because a full repeal of the PLRA is improbable, the next best 
solution is to restructure the PLRA to be more fair to prisoner litigants. 
Though the Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007 died in committee, its 
text and supporters offered thoughtful suggestions from bipartisan 
supporters. This Article’s review of the PLRA’s impact upon RLUIPA 
litigation concludes that changes in the following areas would allow 
more prisoners’ religious claims to reach decisions on their merits.
1. Prior (Unsuccessful) Efforts To Amend The PLRA
Strange partners—as with the original passage of RLUIPA—have 
worked at various points toward changes or amendments to the PLRA, 
which is widely acknowledged to have prevented substantial change 
otherwise possible under RLUIPA. Although never passed, the Prison 
Abuse Remedies Act of 2007, which was introduced in the House 
Judiciary Committee, offered a good deal of hope about how RLUIPA 
may have eventually become more effective.201
200  Courts considering prisoners’ civil suits have legal tests at their disposal that are more than 
sufficient to address issues of successive or abusive litigation. If the entire Act were be repealed 
(even if it was later re-written), legitimate prisoner claims could be heard on the merits—without 
excessive delays and costs. This remedy, however, is admittedly unlikely. 
201 See generally H.R. 4109 110th Cong. (2007).
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“There are two kinds of walls in American prisons,” wrote ACLU 
Legislative Counsel Jesselyn McCurdy, “one that keeps prisoners from 
escaping, and another that keeps the abuse that happens inside from 
ever reaching the light of day. The Prison Litigation Reform Act creates 
prisons within prisons, except with paperwork instead of locks and 
administrative hurdles instead of bars.”202 The proposed amendment, 
among other things, would have exempted juveniles from PLRA’s 
restrictions, removed the “physical injury” requirement (particularly 
from free exercise and other constitutional violation claims), and 
softened exhaustion requirements for all prisoners’ civil lawsuits. The 
bill failed to progress out of the committee, but its diverse support may 
lead to the passage of a similar bill in a future legislative session.
That particular proposed bill garnered support from Jeanne 
Woodford, the former Warden of San Quentin State Prison; Stephen 
Bright, the President of the Southern Center for Human Rights; various 
Attorney Generals; and religious leaders from a variety of faith groups. 
Woodford, perhaps surprisingly, strongly supported and still supports 
the reform as one frustrated by the PLRA’s harsh restrictions: “For those 
prison officials who fear the courts, the PLRA provides an incentive to 
make their grievance procedures more complicated than necessary. As 
a result, prisoners and prison officials are more likely to get tied up in a 
game of ‘gotcha’ rather than spending that time resolving a prisoner’s 
complaint.”203
And in addition to the “usual suspects” of civil rights and criminal 
defense litigators, conservative religious leaders also support more 
generous amendments to the PLRA. As one religious leader testified, 
“Few prisoners file grievance for the simple reason that they know it is 
useless to do so and, just as importantly, because they know they are 
likely to face retaliatory punishment if they do.”204 That understanding 
of the realities faced by prisoners mirrors their own concerns and 
frustrations and helps explain why RLUIPA has not been a more 
effective tool in free exercise litigation.
Congress should reevaluate the failed Prisoner Abuse Remedies 
Act—or craft a document similar to that bill — and include the initial 
proposals in the PLRA to ensure that the RLUIPA becomes more 
effective. Without such action, the rhetoric in support of free exercise, 
the floor comments, the public statements—ring hollow. 
202 See Jesselyn McCurdy, Prison Litigation Reform Act Must be Fixed, Law denies justice to victims 
(Apr. 22, 2008) http://www.aclu.org/prison/gen/34970prs20080422.html (last visited July 25, 2008).
203  Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007: Hearing before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 83 (2008) (statement of Jeanne S. Woodford). 
204  Private Prison Information Act of 2007, and Review of the Prison Litigation Reform Act: A Decade 
of Reform or an Increase in Prison and Abuses?: Hearing before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, 
and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 31 (2007) (statement of David 
Keene, Chairman of the American Conservative Union).
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2. Physical Injury Requirement
The PLRA’s physical injury requirement continues to confound 
courts, though some federal courts have declined to apply it to religious 
practice claims. Repealing this subsection—particularly as it relates to 
RLUIPA issues—makes good sense and allows claims of this sort a 
greater chance of a hearing on the merits. After all “[PLRA]’s purpose to 
insulate from review all claims in which legitimate constitutional issues 
predominate without accompanying physical harm.” 205 “Plainly,” 
the court continues, constitutional claims are “qualitatively different 
from lawsuits seeking damages for ‘insufficient storage locker space, 
a defective haircut by a prison barber, the failure of prison officials 
to invite a prisoner to a pizza party for a departing prison employee, 
and yes, being served chunky peanut butter instead of the creamy 
variety.’”206 
Congress should repeal the requirement that prisoners suffer a 
physical injury in order to recover for mental or emotional injuries 
caused by the failure of a prison to accommodate religious practice 
needs.207 First, as many federal courts interpreting this requirement 
have explained, the subsection of this statute makes little sense in light 
of the emotional or spiritual nature of RLUIPA claims.208 Repealing the 
physical injury requirement would have made a difference in multiple 
cases and at different stages in those cases, and because of the confusion 
caused by its text, lower federal courts are applying independent logic 
to cases’ individual facts.
For example, in Mayfield v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice,209 the 
defendant who won his claim was not able to receive compensatory 
damages due to the PLRA’s physical injury requirement.210
3. Exhaustion Requirement
Amending or repealing the PLRA exhaustion requirement could be 
the most important area requiring Congressional action to enhance the 
likelihood that prisoners may be heard. Requiring that a prisoner who 
has not exhausted administrative remedies at the time a lawsuit is filed 
be permitted to pursue the claim through an administrative- remedy 
process still serves the ultimate purpose of the PLRA—allowing 
problems to be fixed at the local level—without deferring entirely to 
prison officials with an interest in the outcome of RLUIPA litigation. 
This requirement, of course, can prevent prisoners from even having 
205  Dipaelo, 138 F.Supp.2d at 109.
206  Id.
207  Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007, H.R. 4109 §2(a), 110th Cong. (2007).
208  See supra at Section IV (a).
209  529 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2009). 
210  Id. 
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their claims heard—as described supra in Section V. B. 3—or entangle 
prisoner-litigants in extended litigation about technical matters rather 
than the merits of their religious practice claims. 211 
4. Filing Fee Provisions
Congress should modify or repeal the filing fee provisions that 
apply only to prisoners.212 Prisoners are some of the poorest citizens 
of our society, and it stands to reason that a prisoner cannot expect 
to prevail upon a claim if he cannot first afford to file it in court. 
Under the PLRA, before filing a lawsuit, even prisoners must first 
pay a filing fee.213 Those who cannot pay the initial filing fee may still 
file214 but will usually be required to make payments on the balance 
of the filing fee on a monthly basis thereafter.215 Though the impact of 
this upon RLUIPA claims is difficult to measure (since by definition, 
court opinions only describe the outcomes of cases filed), filing fee 
provisions serve as yet another impediment to prisoners’ free exercise 
lawsuits and undermines Congress’s stated support of religious 
practice among prisoners.
5. PLRA Screening Requirements
Even if a prisoner has succeeded in satisfying the stringent 
administrative exhaustion requirement by patiently and timely 
navigating the prison administrative grievance process, he must still 
comply with the PLRA’s screening requirements. It requires federal 
courts to conduct a preliminary screening of all prisoner complaints 
against prison officials and dismiss—sua sponte—any action or claim 
that in the court’s view is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim 
on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a 
defendant who is immune from such relief.
6. The Three-Strike Rule
Furthermore, under the PLRA’s “three-strike” rule, prisoners are 
essentially afforded only three chances to get it right.216 A dismissal 
of the prisoner’s claim for any of the aforementioned reasons counts 
as a strike. Prisoners who have had civil actions or appeals dismissed 
three times before because they were either frivolous or malicious, or 
211  Rogers v. U.S., 696 F.Supp.2d 472 (where the petitioner was prevented from filing his RLUIPA 
lawsuit because he had not exhausted the grievance procedure in the prison where he was 
incarcerated).
212  Though unsuccessful, the Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007, HR 4109 §8(a), proposed 
removing PLRA’s filing fee provision when a prisoner files an appeal in forma pauperis.
213  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2006).
214  Id. § 1915(b)(4).
215  Id. § 1915(b)(2).
216  Id. § 1915 (g).
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failed to state a claim, will not be allowed to file in forma pauperis unless the 
prisoner can prove an “imminent” threat of “serious physical injury.”217 
As described above in Section V.B.3., this provision in particular 
communicates a message of power and danger, even in relation 
to prisoners’ lawsuits about religious matters. Despite obvious 
Congressional concern over frivolous lawsuits, penalties such as the 
ones described in the PLRA are inappropriate if its goal was ever to 
help ensure that prisoners are protected from improper restrictions 
upon their religious practice. 
7. The PLRA And Attorneys’ Fees
Finally, Congress should either repeal or amend the PLRA to allow 
prisoners who prevail on civil rights claims to recover attorney’s fees 
on the same basis as the general public in civil rights cases.218 Another 
factor related to prisoners’ success on these issues relates to their ability 
to retain counsel or locate an organization willing to bring a case on 
their behalf.
Recovery of attorney’s fees is necessary to fund the legal 
organizations—frequently not-for-profit—who accept RLUIPA cases. It 
is these organizations which are penalized by the Act’s restrictions, and 
this doubtless serves as an additional roadblock to litigation through 
limitation of available legal resources. If a lawsuit is meritorious, 
why should a prisoner’s attorney not be awarded fees just as any 
other meritorious litigant would be under the circumstances? Finally, 
under the PLRA, federal courts may revoke “good time credits” from 
prisoners who have filed “frivolous lawsuits.” This provision alone 
deters many prisoners from filing lawsuits challenging their free 
exercise accommodation. 
Any of the requirements of this process, when coupled with the 
three strikes rule, may forever close the courthouse doors to aggrieved 
and deserving plaintiffs. 
____________________________
Although prior legislative attempts to amend the PLRA have failed, 
perhaps the missing piece was full education and information about 
the failure of RLUIPA claims because of technical requirements and 
hurdles. Although members of varied communities have supported the 
simplification of prisoners’ civil claims, the legislative history of the Prison 
Abuse Remedies Act fails to fully discuss the PLRA’s impact upon religious 
free exercise. Including the communities initially supportive of RLUIPA—
and of free exercise generally—may be the key to ensuring that RLUIPA can 
finally have the impact that at least some supporters hoped it would.
217  Id. 
218  Though unsuccessful, the Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007, HR 4109 §7, also proposed 
restoring attorney fees for PLRA claims.
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Concluding Thoughts: On Their Own (Again)
With the benefit of ten years of hindsight, it would be foolish to 
claim that RLUIPA has had no impact prisoners of faith. It clearly has; 
prisoner free exercise claims have never enjoyed particular success – 
under any reviewing test—but some claims are indeed winning. On 
the other hand, the cases that actually do see relief are fewer than many 
expected, and it is not particularly clear that the cases winning relief 
could not have prevailed under the Turner/ O’Lone tests. 
There may be a number of factors that contribute to this relatively 
disappointing impact of a law that garnered such support and 
galvanized such hope.219 It not only gathered bipartisan excitement at 
the time of its passage and signing—it was actually drafted by those 
who usually find themselves on opposing sides of such issues.220 
However, assuming that Congress intended RLUIPA to 
revolutionize legal examination of prisoner free exercise claims, it has 
fallen short of the mark. In order for the legal test of RLUIPA to have 
the broad impact its text implies, Congress must make fundamental 
changes to (or abandon entirely) the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
Nearly a decade after RLUIPA’s passage, American’s imprisoned men 
and women still face significant related to fundamental requirements 
of their faith, and there is little to give hope that the litigation process 
will ever become less complicated, less expensive, or ultimately more 
successful. On legal questions so fact-driven, a claim that faces so many 
procedural hurdles will never be an easy one to win. The difficulty is of 
course compounded by the fact that most of the claims are brought pro 
se and by litigants with limited access to investigation or legal research 
tools. With a federal law threatening loss of “good time” credit and 
other retribution for filing a religious free exercise claim that others 
might view as “frivolous,” the law hardly encourages the imprisoned 
faithful to boldly claim a right to practice as their consciences dictate. 
Who among us would take such risks in order merely to get to court to 
litigate a religious practice issue?
When the courts show few signs of drastically re-interpreting 
PLRA, then any changes are dependent upon a political process. 
Either members of Congress who supported RLUIPA initially should 
reexamine the application of PLRA to those legal claims (or the PLRA 
219  Rare indeed are the issues on which the American Civil Liberties Union, The Christian Legal 
Society, The Family Research Council, The National Association of Evangelicals, and The United 
States Catholic Conference join forces. “The bill was supported by a most unusual coalition of 
religious and civil liberties groups, including the American Civil Liberties Association, Christian 
Coalition, Family Research Council, and People for the American Way. These are organizations that 
almost always find themselves on opposite sides in religious disputes.” B.A Robinson, Religious 
Freedom Restoration Acts Additional Attempts at Federal Legislation: RLPRA and RLUIPA, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/rfra3.htm (accessed July 19, 2011).
220  Timothy J. Houseal, RLUIPA: Protecting Houses of Worship and Religious Liberty, Delaware 
Lawyer, Fall, 2002.
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itself), or the constituents who urged RLUIPA’s passage should 
explain concern to their lawmakers. The problem, though, is that so 
few perceive the discord in Congress (at least publicly) showing full 
support for religious practice in prison while fully supporting a law 
that makes it so difficult to challenge restrictions of that free exercise. 
First steps, though, are discussion and education around this issue. 
The warden and the prisoners’ rights advocate must continue to explain 
the actual consequences—unintended or otherwise—of the PLRA. The 
litigants themselves must carry on as they have been, facing the hurdles 
of administrative remedies, filing fees, and potential retribution for the 
lawsuits they file. And those others who can recognize the benefits of 
religious practice in prison and the solace it can afford must continue 
to explore creative alternatives to singing RLUIPA’s praises while the 
law falls far short of its promises.
